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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

1 OF 1

25 MARCH 1970

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TRENDS

in Communist Propaganda

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25 March 1970


(VOL. XXI, NO. 12)

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25 MARCH 1970

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"DVINA" MANEUVERS

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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 16 - 22 MARCH 1970

Moscow (3856 items)

Indochina	(8%)	18%
[Vietnam	(4%)	7%]
[Laos	(5%)	7%]
[Cambodia	(0.1%)	2%]
China	(9.5%)	7%
Middle East	(9%)	6%
Czechoslovakia	(1%)	4%
[Gromyko Visit	(--)	3%]

Peking (3022 items)

Domestic Issues	(47%)	37%
Indochina	(7%)	23%
[Cambodia	(--)	17%]
[Vietnam	(--)	3%]
[Laos	(7%)	2%
Middle East	(6%)	14%

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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VIETNAM WEEKLY REVIEW

HIGHLIGHTS

PARIS TALKS: At the 59th session both PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien and DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy marked the 20th anniversary of the 19 March Saigon uprising--"Anti-U.S. Day"--with attacks on U.S. "aggression" in South Vietnam over the past 20 years. Vietnamization and the Administration's "downgrading" of the talks were again scored. Touching on the situation in Laos and Cambodia, they alleged the United States is expanding the Laos conflict and is violating Cambodian sovereignty and neutrality.

19 MARCH ANNIVERSARY: Hanoi marks "Anti-U.S. Day" with a meeting and editorial comment, and VNA releases a Nguyen Huu Tho interview about the 19 March 1950 events. Liberation Radio publicizes a meeting sponsored by the NFLSV, the Vietnam Alliance, and the PRG, and an appeal issued by the three groups.

MOSCOW PROPAGANDA: Soviet media publicize solidarity groups' greetings and a Moscow meeting marking the 19 March anniversary. A 22 March Leontyev radio commentary on the war claims that "after a period of relative peace, fierce fighting has once again started."

PEKING PROPAGANDA: Peking reports Vietnamese comment on the 19 March anniversary and notes that a reception was held in Peking on the 19th by the DRV and PRG ambassadors. On the 22d Peking publicizes one of its sporadic reports on military action in the South; the last such report was on 16 February.

SOUTH VIETNAM: Hanoi comments on the war in a NHAN DAN article on the 21st which claims the achievements in Rach Gia-Ca Mau strike a blow at Vietnamization in the delta, and another article on the 22d which praises the destruction of aircraft by Tri-Thien forces. Hanoi radio comment routinely scores the GVN and cites GVN deputies' calls for a new cabinet and Thieu's resignation.

NORTH VIETNAM: VNA on 19 March announces the National Assembly Standing Committee recently met, chaired by Hoang Van Hoan. The committee's chairman, Truong Chinh, was also absent from the last meeting on 18-19 February, but he appeared as recently as 11 March when he received an ambassador. Propaganda continues to mark Lenin's birth centenary: A 22 March QUAN DOI NHAN DAN article by Le Duan on Lenin is broadcast on the 23d.

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PARIS TALKS: 19 MARCH SESSION

PRG REVIEW OF U.S.
AGGRESSION, 1950-70

PRG delegate Nguyen Van Tien,* speaking at the 59th session of the talks, pegged his formal statement to the anniversary of the 19 March 1950 "Anti-U.S. Day" and launched into an attack on the United States' "aggressive colonialist policy" in South Vietnam over the past 20 years. Among other things, he called attention to President Nixon's past positions on the Vietnam question, charging that in 1953 Nixon wanted to fight until "total victory" and that in early 1954 he "opposed all compromises and urged that U.S. troops be sent immediately to Vietnam." Tien also again recalled the President's pre-election pledge to "end the war within six months." (Although Hanoi does not routinely cite such dated quotations from President Nixon to document an attack on him, a 29 September 1969 NHAN DAN article, commenting on the President's 26 September press conference, reviewed his position over the last 20 years in a similar manner.) The PRG delegate went on to score the Administration for backing the Saigon government and maintaining U.S. troops in Vietnam.

Tien repeated the standard position that the NFLSV's 10-point solution contains "logical and reasonable proposals" to settle the conflict. He accused the United States of unwillingness to engage in "genuine" negotiations, of "evading" the basic problems of the 10-point solution, and of dragging the Paris conference "more and more deeply" into an impasse.

Tien also touched on Laos and Cambodia when he repeated the usual accusations that the Nixon Administration is expanding the war in Laos, intensifying air strikes over Laotian "liberated" areas, and "impudently threatens to send more American troops there." Tien charged that the Americans have "never ceased" to violate Cambodia's sovereignty and territory, and are "plotting" to jeopardize its independence, peace, and neutrality.

DRV CRITICISM OF
NIXON ADMINISTRATION

The VNA account of the session notes that DRV delegate Nguyen Minh Vy, like his PRG colleague, accused the United States of committing "aggression" in South Vietnam over the past 20 years. The account briefly notes Vy's routine assertions denouncing Vietnamization

* PRG delegate head Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, also absent from the previous week's session, was continuing her visit in Algeria, according to a 20 March LPA report. Her visit, which began on 16 March, was concluded on the 21st, according to a TASS report that day on her departure for Paris.

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as a policy aimed at prolonging the U.S. military occupation of South Vietnam, but it does not report that Vy cited criticism of the Administration's Vietnamization policy in the Democratic Party statement on foreign policy that was delivered on 14 March by Averell Harriman. It also omits Vy's reference to a 4 March AP report that Senator Muskie charged the Administration was leading the country on the road of "seeking an impossible military victory." VNA reports Vy's standard criticism of President Nixon's affirmation that the U.S. objective in South Vietnam is to ensure the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination. While noting Vy's routine charge that the Administration is downgrading the talks, VNA does not go on to quote his claim that the United States maintains a delegation at the conference only "for the purpose of concealing its real intentions and policies" and putting "pressure on the other parties at the negotiating table."

ATTENTION TO Vy's discussion of Laos is noted in the VNA account, LAOS, CAMBODIA which cites the DRV delegate's routine accusation that the United States has escalated the war in Laos in order to retrieve its "defeat" and achieve a "position of strength" on the Vietnam problem. Vy's statement that Secretary Rogers had "bluntly" said on 17 March that he would not exclude the possibility of using American ground forces in Laos is also noted. The VNA account picks up the DRV delegate's remarks that the American people are "more clearly" seeing the Nixon Administration's "double-faced" policy on the Vietnam, Laos and Cambodian problems. "The signs of the 'credibility gap' of the Nixon Administration become more and more numerous and serious," VNA notes Vy as saying.

While VNA does not report Vy's remarks on Cambodia in his formal statement, it does summarize his rebuttal remarks concerning Cambodia. VNA thus ignores his accusation that the United States is maneuvering to turn Cambodia into a "second Laos or a second South Vietnam." The VNA summary of his rebuttal remarks notes that he cited evidence given by "some U.S. political circles on the U.S. intervention and war escalation in Laos." It also records his denunciation of the United States for "unceasingly encroaching upon the sovereignty and territory and undermining the independence, peace, and neutrality" of Cambodia. VNA further notes that Vy reaffirmed the "unswerving policy" of the DRV of "always" respecting the 1954 Geneva agreements on Indochina, the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos, and the independence, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Cambodia."

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ALLIED REMARKS VNA briefly brushes off the remarks of Ambassador Habib, saying only that he once again put forth the "so-called 'U.S. POW's in Vietnam' question" and giving no indication that he did not deliver a formal statement. VNA says that GVN Ambassador Lam spoke of the "so-called DRV 'intervention' and 'expansion' in Laos and Cambodia."

19 MARCH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS

NORTH The 20th anniversary of National Anti-U.S. Day on 19 March--the day of the 1950 Saigon uprising--is marked by a number of activities and a flurry of propaganda in both the North and South.

The anniversary is routinely marked in the North with a commemorative meeting on 17 March reported by VNA on the 19th. On the 18th Hanoi radio broadcasts the speeches delivered at the meeting. Comment from the North includes NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials of the 19th which are both broadcast by Hanoi radio that day. NHAN DAN routinely denounces Vietnamization and the attempted strengthening of the ARVN as means for extending the war. It praises the correct revolutionary line and leadership of the communists and says that "we have firmly grasped the law of development of the offensive position in protracted revolutionary war." QUAN DOI NHAN DAN echoes the charges against Vietnamization and praises the army methods for combat efficiency and coordination between guerrillas and "concentrated troops." It also claims that the communists, having overcome the allies when they were escalating, can certainly overcome them now.

On the 19th VNA releases a declaration issued by the DRV War Crimes Commission which denounces U.S. "crimes" against Vietnam over the past 20 years. The declaration routinely scores the U.S. use of B-52's, pacification, and Vietnamization. It also charges President Nixon with "deliberately downgrading the Paris conference, declaring that the U.S. must negotiate from strength and, on several occasions insolently threatening the Vietnamese people" that the United States will not hesitate to apply "'energetic and efficient measures' in case our people keep pushing forward the fighting." The declaration concludes by routinely calling for an unconditional U.S. withdrawal and for letting the Vietnamese people settle their internal affairs without foreign interference as the "sole, correct, and steadfast stand" of the DRV and PRG on the settlement of the Vietnam problem and as "the only way to end U.S. crimes."

A Nguyen Huu Tho interview with the Hanoi weekly VIETNAM COURIER, which discusses the 19 March anniversary, is released by VNA on the 18th. The interview is said to have been given during Tho's "recent" visit

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to the DRV. His last known visit to the North was to attend Ho's funeral in September. Following the September visit, Tho went to Peking and then to Moscow. His last reported public appearance was his departure from Moscow in November.

SOUTH Liberation Radio on the 19th reports a meeting in a "liberated area" that day which was sponsored by the NFLSV, the Vietnam Alliance, and the PKG. According to the radio account, Huynh Tan Phat read an appeal from the three groups which had been broadcast on the 18th by the Front. The appeal contains the standard denunciation of Vietnamization, claims that Vietnamization is causing increased "crimes," and it berates the ARVN. The appeal also routinely mentions U.S. troop withdrawals and the downgrading of the Paris talks, and it claims that the Vietnamese smashed the allies while they were escalating the war and that they can surely do it now with the U.S. de-escalation. It states that the "immediate goal" of the people is to step up the offensive and smash Vietnamization. Other propaganda, following the themes outlined in the appeal, includes an appeal and letter from the Saigon Alliance and statements from various communist personages in the South.

SOUTH VIETNAM: MILITARY ACTION, REVOLUTIONARY ADMINISTRATION

NHAN DAN comment on military activities in the South concentrates on the effect of the fighting on pacification and Vietnamization. The NHAN DAN commentary of 21 March, broadcast that day by Hanoi, hails a "great victory" by the Rach Gia-Ca Mau PLAF from 8 to 17 March in allegedly smashing an ARVN pacification operation. The commentary claims this strikes another hard blow at the allied pacification plan in the delta, which it says is a "pilot center" for pacification and Vietnamization. The NHAN DAN article on the 22d, summarized that day by VNA, cites the alleged achievement of the Tri-Thien regional and guerrilla forces in shooting down 100 U.S. aircraft since January. Accounts of the action were broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 21st. The paper calls attention to the increased U.S. use of aircraft, in lieu of infantry troops, and claims that the communist feats have dealt a heavy blow at a "chief war means and important mainstay" for pacification and have contributed to foiling Vietnamization.

A Hanoi broadcast on the 22d reports that on 8 and 9 March the Can Tho provincial revolutionary committee held a conference to review its activities since its inception in August 1969. The Can Tho committee was first reported in communist media before August, however, in a Hanoi radio listing of "recently" established committees broadcast on 9 June 1969.

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CAMBODIA

PEKING PUBLICIZES SIHANOUK CALL FOR LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Peking greeted Sihanouk as Cambodian "head of state" when he arrived in the Chinese capital on 19 March, the day after his dismissal from office. And Chinese media have given wide publicity to a series of statements released by Sihanouk in Peking, including his 23 March call to Cambodian "compatriots" to take up arms to overthrow the new Cambodian Government. As of this writing, however, there has been no direct Peking endorsement of Sihanouk's statements or substantive comment on his position. NCNA and Radio Peking have reported foreign communist comment supporting Sihanouk and, on 24 March, rounded up information from foreign media on events in Cambodia surrounding the "coup."

In disseminating Sihanouk statements, Peking has transmitted the full text of each over NCNA English-language casts but has selectively summarized or ignored some statements in its broadcasts for general audiences. Sihanouk's 23 March message, calling for the formation of a new government and assembly, a liberation army, and a National United Front of Kampuchea,* was broadcast by Radio Peking several times in Cambodian, beginning on the 23d, prior to its 24 March release by NCNA and Peking broadcasts in other languages. Peking widely publicized a 21 March statement issued by Sihanouk's "private secretariat" which denied news from Hong Kong and Japan that he might go to either of those two cities; but a 22 March Sihanouk note which revealed his plans to "live in exile alternately in Moscow and Peking" was carried only by NCNA's English-language transmissions. Peking media have also carried a 23 March Sihanouk message to Cambodian diplomats and officials warning them against supporting the new regime.

APRIVAL IN PEKING, MEETING WITH CHOU Peking's account of Sihanouk's 19 March arrival in the Chinese capital makes no mention of his ouster, identifying him without comment as "head of state." The report notes that he and his wife were greeted by Chou En-lai, Li Hsien-nien, Hsieh Fu-chih, and Wu Fa-hsien. It lists some 40-odd countries which had representatives at the airport--presumably a complete list, since it included even West European nations, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. (Peking has not mentioned

* NCNA abbreviates the Front as FUNK, while LPA calls it UNFC--the United National Front of Cambodia.

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that Sihanouk came to China from Moscow.) The Peking report says that Sihanouk was also "welcomed" by the Cambodian ambassadors to China and the DPRK and Duong Sam Ol, inspector general of the Cambodian armed forces, who is "now in Peking." Later on the 19th Peking media report that Chou held talks with Sihanouk, "in a sincere and friendly atmosphere," and gave a luncheon in honor of Sihanouk and his wife.

SIHANOUK STATEMENT
OF 20 AND 21 MARCH

Peking media belatedly acknowledged Sihanouk's 18 March ouster more than two days after the fact, when they publicized his first major pronouncement on his situation, a three-part statement, the first part dated 20 March and the last two dated the 21st. The statement was carried in its entirety by NCNA's English-language transmission--the first part being transmitted early on the 21st, Peking time, and parts two and three on the 22d. The statement has also been carried by NCNA Chinese-language transmission, with some deletions from the second part, and publicized widely by Peking radio.

The 20-21 March statement begins with Sihanouk's declaration that his deposition is "absolutely illegal," but concludes with a promise to resign once the present regime is overthrown. In the first part of the statement, Sihanouk proposes holding a referendum supervised by armed contingents from India, Canada, and Poland, within the framework of the ICC; and he says that such intervention would conform to the spirit of the 1954 Geneva agreements and has precedent in the ICC supervision of Cambodian elections in 1955.

In rejecting "false pretexts" for his deposition, Sihanouk raises the issue of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Peking radio and NCNA report his allusion to Vietnamese "infiltration" and his remark that he has "denounced" this infiltration "many times," as well as his statement that contacts with "the Vietnamese concerned" and "operations" against "groups of armed Vietnamese" had "considerably reduced the number of the NFL elements stationed on our territory."

The second part of Sihanouk's statement, dealing mainly with the charges against him by the new Cambodian Government, does not receive the wide broadcast attention given the first and third parts by Radio Peking. The reasons for restricted attention to the second part are pointed up by the nature of the passages carried by NCNA English but omitted by NCNA in Chinese--details of Sihanouk's refutation of charges of corruption and mishandling of public funds for personal gain, his denial that he would grant money to a pretty girl for a smile, and his statement that "today, I live on the generosity of the Soviet and Chinese governments which accommodate me, my wife, and my suite during our stay in Moscow or Peking."

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In the third part of the statement, carried in full by the radio and NCNA, Sihanouk does not recall his suggestion for a referendum, and he maintains that he is behind-the-times and should not rule. He declares that: "I absolutely have no intention of seeking to resume the power which in fact I have lost or of retaining the now absurd title of head of state of Cambodia." He vows to tender his resignation "after the inevitable downfall in the near future of the reactionary clique of the extreme right, lackeys of American Imperialists," declaring that the people can then set up a regime "rooted in the people, that is to say, the mass of peasants, workers, other working people and young intellectuals." He concludes that it is his "duty to participate in the sacred struggle our people will wage from inside and outside the country to obliterate this coup d'etat and restore legality and democracy."

SIHANOUK CALL FOR
FRONT, LIBERATION ARMY

Sihanouk's five-point platform for the formation of national liberation organizations to overthrow the new Cambodian

government was released to the press in Peking in a communique from Sihanouk's "private secretariat" on 23 March and was contained in a recorded message read by Sihanouk and broadcast by Peking in Cambodian on the same day. The message was repeated in China's Cambodian-language broadcasts on the 23d and 24th and then carried by NCNA, along with the secretariat communique, late on the 24th. The five points have since been widely broadcast by Peking; but, at the time of writing, there is no Chinese comment on them.

The platform, outlined in somewhat different language in the Sihanouk message and secretariat communique, begins with the announcement that Sihanouk has dissolved the Cambodian cabinet headed by Gen. Lon Nol, the National Assembly, and the royal council. It states that a "national union government" will be set up and a "consultative assembly" will be established with members representing various groups with "patriotic, progressive, and anti-imperialist tendencies." The fourth point calls for the formation of a "national liberation army" which, according to the communique, will have the task of "liberating the motherland" from the present regime and struggling against "the U.S. imperialists, a struggle which will be carried on together with other anti-imperialist people's forces of fraternal countries." The final point of the platform visualizes the formation of a "National United Front of Kampuchea," which has the task of "liberating the country and rebuilding it after victory over the imperialist enemy and its lackeys."

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Sihanouk's message enlarges on the question of outside assistance for the struggle. In defining the duties of the Front, he states that it will struggle against the United States "side by side with the socialist, progressive, anti-imperialist countries or peoples, far and near, with their complete support." In a concluding passage calling for his supporters in Cambodia to wage guerrilla warfare, Sihanouk seems to suggest that assistance in weapons, and probably, training, has already been promised. He pledges to provide "munitions and new arms" at "opportune moments" to those who are already trained and to "take necessary measures to send" those without arms or military skills to the "military school" of the Front, "which is being established way out from your barracks and villages." The remote location of the school, he states, insures "that the enemy will not be able to reach or locate it." Consistent with his previously announced plan to live alternately in Peking and Moscow, Sihanouk directs Cambodians in the European area to "come to call on me" at either capital.

Sihanouk touches upon Cambodia's relations with the DRV in denying the charge that he had "sold out" the country to foreign countries. Sihanouk says he was guided by concern to protect Cambodia's reputation for "wisdom and maturity" and to avoid "running into great danger in the future by provoking recklessly and with undue hostility socialist Vietnam, which the United States, the richest and biggest military power of the world, failed to bring to its knees."

The five-point platform makes no mention of Sihanouk's role in the Front, but Sihanouk's message suggests that he will be a figurehead for a "liberation" struggle aimed at acquiring power for the "working people." In his message, Sihanouk repeats his pledge, in the third part of his 20-21 March statement, to resign his position as head of state after the "people's certain victory." Indulging in self criticism, he declares that he has become aware of his own "unpardonable naivete and misjudgment" which made him believe that "a free, democratic, peaceful, prosperous, and happy country could be built with the help of such notorious personages, the corrupt bourgeois elements and princes, fascists, reactionaries as those making up the present 'government' and 'parliament' of Phnom Penh." He adds that he "will never forget" this lesson and that, "in view of his misjudgment," he will resign after victory and "give our progressive youth and working people the possibility of fully assuming the responsibility of national construction and defense" Elsewhere in the message he similarly stipulates that, after victory, power will remain in the hands of the "working people."

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DRV DECLARES "TOTAL SUPPORT" FOR SIHANOUK "LIBERATION" CALL

A 25 March DRV Government statement on Cambodia expresses the DRV's "total support" for Prince Sihanouk's 23 March statement advocating a Cambodian liberation front to overthrow the Lon Nol regime. At the same time the DRV reaffirms that it "scrupulously" respects Cambodian independence, sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity, and declares that DRV policy prescribes that the DRV and Cambodia "will not interfere in each other's internal affairs."

After an initial delay of a day or two in acknowledging Sihanouk's Peking-broadcast speech on 23 March, Vietnamese communist media give it full attention on the 24th and 25th. Hanoi radio and Liberation Radio earlier had carried lengthy reports of Sihanouk's 20-21 March statement, with NHAN DAN Commentator articles on the 23d and 24th expressing "resolute support" for Sihanouk's determination to struggle against his opponents. Hanoi has not acknowledged either Western press reports that DRV Premier Pham Van Dong flew to Peking over the weekend to confer with Sihanouk, or that Vietnamese communist diplomats in Phnom Penh were continuing contacts with the Cambodian Foreign Ministry, as reported on the 25th in a Cambodian Government communique.

DRV GOVERNMENT STATEMENT As carried both by Hanoi's domestic service and VNA on the 25th, the DRV Government statement observes that, "proceeding from the principle that the liberation of Cambodia is the Khmer people's undertaking, the DRV Government declares its total support for Chief of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk's five-point statement of 23 March 1970 and firmly supports the Khmer people's struggle, under Chief of State Norodom Sihanouk's leadership, against the U.S. imperialists and their henchmen." It expresses firm belief that "all strata of the Khmer people will respond" to Sihanouk's appeal "for national salvation" and that the Khmers "will courageously overcome all difficulties and hardships and persist in their just struggle."

The statement says the Cambodian coup "has betrayed the Cambodian people's supreme interests" and Sihanouk's "correct line," has "sabotaged the warm friendship and militant solidarity" of Cambodians, Vietnamese, and Laotians, and has "seriously threatened the peace and security of this region." It recalls Sihanouk's 23 March speech calling on Cambodians to form a united national front and to unite with the Indochinese peoples and the "anti-imperialist forces of fraternal countries" to resist "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."

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DRV policy regarding Cambodia, the statement adds, is "to maintain and strengthen relations" on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence and the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina, and "to scrupulously respect" Cambodia's "independence, sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity." It calls the new Cambodian Government a "group of reactionaries, servants of imperialism," and says the 18 March coup was aimed "against the Cambodian people and the Vietnamese people's patriotic struggle" against the United States. It notes that "militant solidarity" among the Vietnamese, Khmer, and Laotian peoples is "an important factor for victory."

**EARLY HANOI
TREATMENT**

Hanoi's first monitored acknowledgment of Sihanouk's ouster on the 18th was not until the 21st--a brief VNA report attributed to foreign news agencies reporting Sihanouk's ouster by a "pro-American extreme rightist group" and noting that National Assembly Chairman Cheng Heng has been named acting chief of state. Subsequently VNA summarized other Western news agency reports concerning the "real power" in Cambodia being held by General Lon Nol and his deputy Sirik Matak, a U.S. State Department statement on recognition of the new government, official Thai opinions that the change would improve the allied military position, and GVN President Thieu's "very happy" reaction to the coup.

VNA briefly comments on its own on the 21st, saying that with the "zealous" assistance of the U.S. propaganda machine, the Cambodian "extreme rightist group"--an appellation now common in Hanoi propaganda on Cambodia--had launched a "furious" campaign against the Vietnamese people before and after the coup intended to "feverishly" stir up race hatred of the Vietnamese. This campaign at the same time, VNA charges, was designed to "conceal" the United States' "conspiracy" by alleging that Cambodia was in a "state of danger," thus enabling the rightist group to use this as a pretext to repress adherents of Sihanouk's policies of peace, independence, and neutrality. VNA takes note of an AFP report asserting that public opinion is fearful that Cambodia may become a new theater of the war that has already embroiled Laos and Vietnam.

A Hanoi Radio commentary on the 21st expresses the belief that the Cambodian people will "continue to develop" their struggle against the United States and its "hirelings" while holding fast to solidarity and friendship with the Vietnamese. The DRV's view of Cambodian developments is stated on a more authoritative level on the 22d, in a NHAN DAN Commentator's article and a QUAN DOI NHAN DAN commentary of the same day. The NHAN DAN Commentator alleges that one of the "immediate" American goals in "engineering the coup" is to use Cambodia in the war against the Vietnamese communist side. Commentator calls this "plot" an application of Nixon's doctrine of "using Asians to fight Asians."

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LIBERATION FRONT
COVERAGE

Liberation Front media also acknowledge Sihanouk's ouster for the first time on the 21st, in an LPA dispatch similar to VNA's first item but citing the Cambodian radio as its source for the news of Sihanouk's removal. LPA says "public opinion from east to west is unanimous" in asserting that the coup was "masterminded" by the United States. Front media on the 22d carry an LPA Commentator article which expounds on previously stated themes alleging U.S. "conspiracy" and the like.

HANOI, FRONT TREATMENT OF SIHANOUK STATEMENTS Sihanouk's 23 March speech urging the formation of a Cambodian liberation army and liberation front to overthrow the Lon Nol government is broadcast textually over Hanoi's Vietnamese services on the 24th and 25th, transmitted by VNA in English on the 25th, and broadcast by Liberation Radio on the 25th after being summarized by LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY on the 24th. Hanoi's VNA on the 25th also transmits the text of Sihanouk's 23 March message to Cambodian diplomats and civil servants, warning them not to side with the new government.

Sihanouk's earlier lengthy statement condemning his ouster, issued in Peking on 20-21 March, is reported extensively by Hanoi and Liberation Radio on the 23d. Both radios uniformly and completely delete Sihanouk's references to a civil and military role for the International Control Commission in supervising his proposed national referendum and the statement's reference to a 1955 precedent for such a ICC role. (There is no Vietnamese comment on General Lon Nol's recently reported request to the 1954 Geneva Conference co-chairmen, the USSR and UK, concerning the reinstitution of the ICC supervisory and control mechanism as a way of limiting communist use of Cambodia.)

A Hanoi radio commentary on the 23d, also carried by VNA English the same day, "warmly welcomes" Sihanouk's 20-21 March statement and declares "resolute support" for the Prince's "just" struggle to "negate the coup." The commentary enlarges upon selected excerpts from the statement. It notes in part that, in the face of the United States' "hurried" recognition of the Lon Nol government, Sihanouk issued his "stern warning" to those countries having diplomatic relations with Cambodia not to extend this recognition to the new leaders because "unfortunate circumstances" might arise. The commentary notes Sihanouk's assertion that he covets no ambitions of power and will immediately resign when, according to the commentary, Cambodia is "liberated from the yoke of U.S. imperialism and its stooges." A NHAN DAN Commentator article on the 24th also cites the statement and comments on it in a similar fashion to the article of the 23d.

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HANOI, FRONT DIFFER
ON INFILTRATION CLAIM

Curiously, Hanoi and Liberation radios differ in their treatment of a key section from the Sihanouk 20-21 March statement in their

23 March reports on it. Both radios summarize that part of the statement dealing with the Lon Nol government's charges against the Prince, in particular the one dealing with Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia. Surprisingly, Hanoi acknowledges Sihanouk's references to Vietnamese infiltration of Cambodia in summarizing the basic substance of his statement, by including his denunciation of the coup makers who have used false pretexts. According to Hanoi, Sihanouk said "that the Vietnamese resisting American imperialism infiltrated into our country. This infiltration, which I myself have denounced to the world many times, is not a new question. Moreover, the infiltrations have been reduced considerably in recent days." Liberation Radio's far more circumspect treatment of the passage is highly sanitized, reflecting the usual Vietnamese communist sensitivity on this issue.* It merely notes that among the "false" pretexts is the allegation "that the Vietnamese resisting American imperialism infiltrated into our country."

MOSCOW MEDIA CAUTIOUS ON CAMBODIAN DEVELOPMENTS

Moscow promptly reported the Sihanouk ouster--in a straightforward TASS dispatch on the 19th citing AP--and has subsequently publicized Western press reports pointing to alleged U.S., and specifically CIA, involvement in the affair. Comment to date has been minimal, the most authoritative being 22 and 25 March PRAVDA articles by commentators Mikhaylov and Mayevskiy. Dwelling on the "political crisis" in Cambodia--and pointedly omitting any reference to Sihanouk himself--Mikhaylov says that the Western press has offered numerous suppositions regarding U.S. "interference" and has noted the "parallel" with the situation in South Vietnam in 1963 when Diem was assassinated. The text of the Mayevskiy article is not yet available, but the lengthy TASS summary, like the Mikhaylov commentary, fails to mention Sihanouk by name, referring rather to the "events in Cambodia" and at a later point to the "recent Soviet-Cambodian talks in Moscow." Indicating concern over developments, the commentator says that the Soviet Union is "attentively" following the situation in

* Vietnamese communist media and spokesmen at the Paris talks have on numerous occasions in the past "refuted" what is normally characterized as a "slander" against the Vietnamese people--reports of Vietnamese communist infiltration and use of Cambodia.

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Cambodia and the "maneuvers of imperialist forces around that country," and adds that the USSR, "just as other friends of the Cambodian people, is by far not indifferent to the attempts by certain forces to violate the Geneva Agreements in respect to Cambodia." Mayevsky also comments that a change in Cambodia's foreign political leanings would lead to "more serious consequences" both for Cambodia and that part of the world; the Indochinese and Southeast Asian situation could "become even more complicated, thus having an extremely negative effect on the entire international situation." That is why, he adds, that the "public in Asian countries view the undermining of Cambodia's independence as an integral part of the imperialist plot against the Asian peoples."

SIHANOUK STATEMENTS In addition to drawing on Western reports on Cambodian developments, Soviet reportage has taken note of Vietnamese reaction. TASS on the 24th, for example, reports on LPA and NHAN DAN commentaries, noting the latter's statement that the Vietnamese people resolutely support the Cambodian people's struggle in defense of national liberation and sovereignty. The TASS item fails to mention, however, that the NHAN DAN commentary was pegged to Sihanouk's 20-21 March Peking-issued statement or that the DRV paper voiced support for Sihanouk's determination to struggle against the new Cambodian leaders. Moscow has, in fact, given little attention to Sihanouk's statements in exile. TASS on the 21st did briefly report on his statement of 20-21 March. But it highlighted his remarks on a possible ICC role in monitoring a proposed Cambodian national referendum--a passage deleted in the lengthy Hanoi and Front replays of the statement--and ignored his declaration of intent to struggle against the new Cambodian leaders. At this writing, there is no available Moscow report of the 23 March Sihanouk statement.

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LAOS

SOUPHANOUVONG PRESSES NLHX PEACE PROPOSAL, ATTACKS U.S.

Radio Pathet Lao on 23 March releases the text of Prince Souphanouvong's message to Prince Souvanna Phouma on the situation in Laos. The message, dated the 10th and delivered to Souvanna in Vientiane on the 22d, breaks no new ground in assessing the "tense situation" in the country as a result of the "intensified U.S. war of aggression." Detailing alleged U.S. culpability, the message repeats charges contained in the 6 March NLHX statement, declaring that the United States--which has "ceaselessly undermined" the Geneva agreements on Laos--has brought in U.S. military personnel, stepped up its supplies of weapons and other war materiel, and introduced Thai infantry and artillery to join with the Laotian special forces and to launch "nibbling" attacks against the areas controlled by the Laotian "patriotic forces."

The message endorses the 6 March five-point NLHX proposal for a peaceful settlement of Laotian questions, a proposal "based on the 1962 Geneva agreement for Laos and the true situation in Laos at present."* It stresses that Laotian questions "must be solved by the parties concerned in Laos" and urges that Souvanna, to demonstrate sincerity, agree to an "immediate, complete, and unconditional halt to the U.S. bombing raids against Laos to create conditions for all parties concerned in Laos to negotiate and to solve Laotian internal affairs."

In interviews released on the 20th and 23d, Souphanouvong reaffirms the Pathet Lao view that the five-point proposal must serve as the basis for a settlement and, as in his message, is critical of U.S. involvement. Souphanouvong says in the second of the interviews--granted to a correspondent of the Hungarian television service on 16 March and reported by the Pathet Lao news agency (KPL)--that President Nixon's 6 March statement on Laos contained "practically nothing new" and was most significant because it represented the first high-level admission of U.S. military involvement in Laos. In the earlier interview, one with a team of Japanese television correspondents that was carried by both the KPL and Hanoi's VNA, he says that President Nixon is attempting in Laos to carry out "neocolonialism in a new form" and to promote the "Nixon doctrine," the policy of "using Asians to fight Asians," despite U.S. domestic opposition fearing a "second Vietnam." Souphanouvong asserts that the level

* The NLHX peace proposal is discussed in the TRENDS of 11 March 1970, pages 6-8.

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of U.S. "'advisers' and military personnel" in Laos has reached 10,000 and that U.S. planes have engaged in "bombing, strafing, and the spraying of toxic chemicals on a genocidal scale against the free zone of Laos."

NLHX Secretary General Phoumi Vongvichit, in an interview with a KPL correspondent on the 20th, says the Nixon Administration has "brazenly declared" its intention to continue its present policy toward Laos and that such spokesmen as Vice President Agnew, Secretary Rogers, and Under Secretary Richardson have "leveled threats" at the Laotian people in warning that the United States does not rule out the possibility of sending U.S. ground troops to Laos. And a 21 March NLHX Central Committee statement in Hanoi, transmitted by VNA on the 21st and broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao the following day, also points up U.S. spokesmen's remarks on possible use of American ground forces.

THAI TROOPS According to KPL on the 24th, Souphanouvong sent an "urgent message" to Souvanna Phouma on 22 March--the date his message of the 10th to Souvanna Phouma was delivered--protesting as "particularly serious" the dispatch by air of "several battalions of Thai combat troops" to Long Cheng in the Plain of Jars. The 21 March NLHX Central Committee statement had taken note of the fact that two Thai "mercenary battalions" were recently sent to the Long Cheng area, observing that this and other "adventurous acts of the United States and its Thai lackey" were carried out "at precisely the time" when Souphanouvong's emissary was on his way to Vientiane. A 21 March Radio Pathet Lao commentary similarly points up the timing of the arrival of the Thai troops and the dispatch of the emissary to Vientiane.

DRV FOREIGN MINISTRY STATEMENT ASSAILED U.S. INVOLVEMENT

The DRV reaffirms its support for the NLHX five-point peace proposal and presses its attack against alleged U.S. responsibility for the Laotian crisis in a 22 March Foreign Ministry statement. The statement, carried textually by Hanoi's domestic service and VNA on the 22d, says that public opinion in Laos and the world, including "U.S. progressives," supports the NLHX political solution; nonetheless, it adds, the Nixon Administration continues to escalate the "war of aggression" in Laos. The statement says that President Nixon at his 21 March press conference "admitted" that Thailand is being involved in activities in Laos. As routine propaganda has done, the statement further notes that Secretary Laird on the 19th indicated that the United States "will continue bombing" Laotian territory and that Secretary Rogers on the 17th intimated the possible use of U.S. combat troops in Laos. The statement also says that on 20 March

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the United States "openly brought two more battalions of Thai mercenary troops" to Laos, "having stealthily sent to Laos about 5,000 Thai mercenary troops in the middle of 1969." A NHAN DAN commentary on the 22d, reviewed by VNA, repeats the essence of the DRV Foreign Ministry statement without attribution.

Concerning claims that North Vietnamese forces are in Laos, VNA on the 24th "resolutely refutes" such "slander." The VNA denial is pegged to Souvanna Phouma's "allegations about North Vietnam's so-called aggression against Laos," observing that the charges are "aimed at covering up the U.S. war intensification in Laos and hiding the fact that the Vientiane authorities themselves are serving this aggressive policy." On the 23d, a Hanoi radio report--beamed to South Vietnamese listeners--of the 9 March Souphanouvong interview said the Prince stated that President Nixon on 6 March had "tried to deliberately distort the truth and falsely accuse the DRV of bringing troops to Laos." These remarks do not appear in the 20 March KPL and VNA versions of the interview.

PRG STATEMENT The LIBERATION PRESS AGENCY (LPA) on the 24th carries the text of a 22 March PRG Foreign Ministry statement which levels a largely routine attack against the United States, noting among other things its use of B-52 bombers for "extermination raids against the Lao people" and its dispatching of Thai "mercenaries" to Long Cheng. The statement endorses the NLHX peace proposal and voices full support for and sympathy with the Lao people's "just fight in self-defense." Earlier on the 24th, a VNA service message from Hanoi to the news agency's Paris bureau had carried the PRG Foreign Ministry statement.

MOSCOW HAILS "REALISTIC" PEACE PLAN, PEKING IGNORES PROPOSAL

Wide publicity for Kosygin's message to President Nixon--first acknowledged by Radio Moscow on the 15th but not released in full--accounts for the bulk of the substantial volume of Soviet propaganda on Laos. At this writing, there has been no Moscow report of the President's followup letter of 23 March to Kosygin, announced at Secretary Rogers' press conference on the 23d. (The TASS account of that press conference says only that Rogers, "touching upon the situation in Southeast Asia," indicated that the United States "will continue bombing the territory of Laos . . . to 'protect' the U.S. troops in South Vietnam.")

Propaganda continues to voice support for the NLHX five-point peace plan and to level attacks against U.S. involvement in Laos. Typically, a 24 March IZVESTIYA article by Ilyinskiy, reviewed by TASS, says that the restoration of peace in the country depends on consultations between the Laotian political forces on the basis of the "realistic five-point

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program." But the commentator points to Secretary Laird's recent statement on bombing as evidence that the United States "wages an undeclared war in Laos to turn it into a U.S. colony of the new type," into a "military base of the United States in Indochina and in Southeast Asia." In this vein, a domestic service commentary on the 22d says that the continuation of U.S. "aggression" in South Vietnam and the present "attempts to interfere" in Cambodian affairs "are inseparable from the desire to set up a U.S. political and military bridgehead in Laos."

A foreign-language commentary on the 23d sees U.S. "armed intervention in Laos reaching more and more dangerous proportions," and cites among other factors the presence of "12,000 American troops" and the "big role" played by the CIA. An English-language talk for African listeners on the 20th charges that recent remarks by Administration spokesmen on possible use of ground troops in Laos are intended "to condition public opinion to an open, large-scale American military intervention in Laos under the pretext that this step is the only way to avert a total failure." The commentator adds that the intervention in South Vietnam was prepared in a similar way, and concludes that the White House call for consultations among the signatories of the 1962 Geneva accords is nothing but "a hypocritical diverting maneuver."

Propagandists have noted the dispatch of Thai troops by U.S. aircraft to Long Cheng, and at least one commentary has underscored the timing. A domestic service talk on the 21st says that U.S. correspondents have stressed that disclosure of the transfer of the Thai units "came immediately after the trip to Vientiane by a Laotian Patriotic Front representative, who was to explain the program formulated for peaceful settlement." Available Moscow reports of President Nixon's 21 March press conference have not mentioned his remarks on Thai troops.

Moscow has apparently not yet acknowledged the contents of Souphanouvong's letter to Souvanna Phouma, broadcast by Radio Pathet Lao on the 23d. It has, however, given publicity to other key statements on Laos, including the DRV and PRG Foreign Ministry statements of the 22d and the NLHX CC statement on 21 March.

PEKING A diminishing volume of Peking propaganda continues to ignore the NLHX peace proposal, at the same time giving publicity to charges of U.S. involvement and culpability and to the military gains of the patriotic forces. Thus, NCNA on the 23d and 24th reports, respectively, on the 21 March NLHX CC statement and the DRV Foreign Ministry statement, but touches only on those portions assailing the U.S. role, including the dispatch of Thai troops. The NCNA account of President Nixon's 21 March press conference says that he "admitted"

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the United States is sending "more and more" Thai troops into Laos because of Thailand's alleged "interest" in that country. This U.S. policy, NCNA concludes, "can only further expose the fact that regardless of any 'doctrine' or slogan dished up by Nixon, the aggressive nature and ambitions of U.S. imperialism remain unchanged."

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MIDDLE EAST

MOSCOW: PHANTOM DECISION DOES NOT CHANGE ARMS FLOW TO ISRAEL

Initial Soviet reaction to the U.S. decision on military and economic assistance to Israel, announced by Secretary Rogers at a press conference on 23 March, takes the line that the decision changes nothing for Israel, since the "announced postponement" of additional aircraft deliveries does not affect the flow of war materials agreed to earlier. TASS promptly and briefly reports the Secretary's press conference, at which he announced that a decision on further deliveries of Phantom and Skyhawk aircraft would be held in abeyance for the present, but that economic assistance involving food programs and credits for balance due on past military contracts would be extended.

Moscow gave minimal and delayed attention to President Nixon's 21 March press conference in which he foreshadowed the decision: the President's press conference was not acknowledged until late on the 22d, in broadcasts in Italian and in English to North America noting that he dwelt on the "so-called theory of the balance of forces," which Moscow says was received in Israel as assurance of further American support. The broadcast to North America says Israel is expecting new consignments of U.S. planes, and "there are also reports that American pilots will go to Israel." It also picks up a 22 March New York TIMES report of a British admiral's suggestion for British and West European air protection to guarantee Middle East frontiers, saying the plan is being examined by NATO.

Like other current comment, the broadcast in English claims Israel is trying to obtain arms from other countries and mentions efforts to acquire British Centurion tanks from the Netherlands. A domestic service commentary on the 22d, also dealing with "intrigues" of the Israeli military "in the smaller NATO countries," asserts that Washington's "condition of absolute secrecy," which from now on will conceal all further supplies of U.S. weapons to Israel, will be extended to similar deals between Israel and the NATO countries. Panelists on the 22 March domestic service roundtable discussion also maintain that the United States wants to conceal its armaments deliveries behind a veil of secrecy; and they claim that the Arabs see through his tactic since it is "complete nonsense" to speak of a "so-called balanced policy" in the Middle East while providing Israel with offensive weapons.

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TASS commentator Velichanskiy on the 23d provides the first substantial comment on the President's press conference remarks. He points out that the President "twice stressed" that the delay in a solution to the question of additional aircraft deliveries is only temporary. On the basis of previous arms contracts, Velichanskiy says, Israel receives all its wants from the United States, including Phantoms, and "will continue receiving these purely offensive weapons in much greater quantities than are needed to restore the losses." He says President Nixon's assurance that the United States will not allow a change in the present correlation of forces is in effect a promise to insure that Israel retains its air superiority. He complains that the President, although declaring a Middle East political settlement as one of the aims of U.S. policy, did not even mention the November 1967 Security Council resolution which is the basis for such a solution.

ROGERS PRESS CONFERENCE In reporting Secretary Roger's 23 March press conference, TASS notes that the President has decided "to hold in abeyance for now" a decision with respect to additional aircraft, but that the U.S. Government will watch the situation closely and will be in a position to provide additional as well as replacement aircraft should the situation require. TASS adds that Israel will receive credits amounting to 100 million dollars, and mentions that the Secretary set out a four-point program for a diplomatic settlement of the Middle East situation. Secretary Rogers said, TASS adds, that this program does not contain any new elements. TASS does not indicate the nature of the points--calling for adherence to the cease-fire resolutions, reappraisal of positions by the parties to the conflict, support for proposals enabling Jarring to initiate negotiations, and early arms limitation talks--and they have not been mentioned in subsequent comment.

In the first available comment on Rogers' remarks, Moscow domestic service correspondent Lipovetskiy observes on the 24th that while Washington wishes the decision to be viewed as an "important peace-loving step," the announcement concerning economic aid accords Israel "favorable conditions for further increasing its war potential." In speaking about the "so-called preservation of the balance" in the Middle East, Lipovetskiy says, Washington "clearly has in mind the future preservation of Israel's aggressive potential." He concludes that the decision looks peaceful "only from the outside," but is in effect a new attempt to justify pressure on the Arabs and constitutes another "act of support" for Israel.

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Later on the 24th Yefremov, in a domestic service commentary, has trouble explaining why the requested aircraft "remain for the present" in the United States. He finds "no simple answer," falling back on speculation that both international and domestic reasons must be involved, including the influence of the "principled positions of the Soviet Union and France" as well as a shift in American public opinion favoring U.S. withdrawal from the Middle East conflict. Yefremov concludes that Washington loses nothing by the decision and intends to obtain much, continuing to support its Israeli "proteges" but trying to create the appearance of objectivity.

U.S. OIL INTERESTS An Arabic-language commentary on the 24th explains the announcement on aircraft deliveries as a "futile" U.S. effort to lessen the "bad effects" of the American Middle East policy, arguing that Washington needs to change its image in the Arab world to protect its vulnerable oil interests from increasing Arab demands for sanctions against U.S. oil monopolies. Both this commentary and a Vavilov foreign-language commentary the same day claim that Washington does not intend to abandon its support for Israel. Vavilov, however, goes on to take the tack that the United States needs Israel as a "watchdog" to protect its oil interests.

Volskiy in the 24 March RED STAR attempts to resolve this contradiction: He points out that the increasing "comprehensive" U.S. assistance to Israel is damaging American positions in the Arab world, even in those capitals traditionally friendly toward the United States, and thus endangering the profits of the oil companies. While it would appear that Washington would have to be concerned with normalizing relations with the Arabs, in practice it is doing everything to insure a deterioration of these relations, Volskiy says, asking "how does one tie up the ends here?" In a convoluted explanation, he claims the "major monopolies" use U.S. "Zionist circles" as a screen behind which they conceal their true aims--chiefly the U.S. aspiration "to 'bar the path' to some kind of 'Soviet expansion'" in the Near East, to undermine the cooperation between the USSR and the developing states, and to halt the development of the national liberation movement.

ARAB "DEFENSIVE MEASURES" The Lipovetskiy domestic service commentary on the 24th points out that in replying to a question Secretary Rogers "admitted that arms for the Arab countries are destined only for defensive purposes." In accordance with customary practice, Moscow has not acknowledged reports of the delivery of SA-3 missiles to the UAR. But TASS commentator Tyssovskiy on the 21st underlines UAR "defensive measures" in comment broadcast to Soviet domestic audiences. Commenting on reported threats by Israeli

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Defense Minister Dayan to bomb towns and other populated areas, Tyssovskiy says such "frenzied threats" are caused "by the measures taken by the Egyptian command to protect the country's airspace." Listening to Dayan, he adds, one gets the impression that the UAR's "defense measures" constitute a direct threat to the vital positions of the Israeli forces in the Suez Canal zone and to the effectiveness of Israeli air operations "deep in the Egyptian rear." Tyssovskiy adds that the "measures taken by the UAR leadership to strengthen the air defenses will not allow the aggressor to carry out with impunity piratical raids against civilian targets inside the country." Tel Aviv should bear in mind, he warns, that "the aggressor's threats" to pass from words to deeds will not be allowed to go unpunished.

An Arabic-language commentary on the 24th says "another factor" influencing Washington's "recent maneuvers" is "Soviet determination to take effective measures in the future also to strengthen Arab defensive power" in the face of Israel's policy of "escalating force." Washington's stand, it adds, reflects the dilemma of those still relying on force, a policy which is "futile and useless."

The most authoritative current pledge of Soviet support comes in the communique on Gromyko's visit to Czechoslovakia, TASS on the 22d reporting that the communique says the USSR and Czechoslovakia will continue giving support to the Arab states and peoples "in their just struggle for the elimination of the aftermath of the Israeli aggression" and for the withdrawal of Israeli troops.

ANTI-ZIONIST CAMPAIGN The reduced anti-Zionist campaign continues as of the 24th, with TASS reporting SOVIET RUSSIA as asserting that the Israeli working class will continue its struggle against Zionist policy and maintaining that the "Jewish problem," which can be settled "by class struggle and the victory of a socialist revolution," is nonexistent in the USSR. TASS press reviews of the 21st and 22d indicate that Moscow papers of those dates feature materials purporting to demonstrate the existence of anti-Semitism in the United States.

The last available report of letters by Soviet Jewish citizens to newspapers and public organizations was carried by TASS on the 20th, the same day that a Soviet regional radio reported a protest meeting in Sakhalin in the Soviet Far East. The protests by Soviet Jews appear to be continuing sporadically, with Birobidzhan radio reporting on the 24th a meeting in that city to condemn the "aggressive actions and slanderous propaganda of Israel's ruling circles and international Zionism."

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PEKING GIVES BIG WELCOME TO PALESTINIAN FEDAYEEN DELEGATION

In contrast to Moscow's subdued treatment of the February visit by a Palestinian fedayeen delegation to the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee, Peking flaunts the arrival in Peking of a Palestinian delegation, again led by Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat. NCNA on 21 March recounts the ostentatious arrival ceremony in Peking at which the delegation was welcomed, to the sound of gongs and drums, by Li Hsien-nien, vice premier of the State Council; Chiu Hui-tso, deputy chief of the PLA general staff; Kuo Mo-jo, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, and other dignitaries.

The same day the Palestinian guests were feted at a banquet hosted and addressed by Li and attended by Arab diplomats and the head of the PLO mission in Peking. This mission was originally set up as a result of the March 1965 visit to Peking by the then PLO chairman ash-Shuqayri, but apparently ceased to function following ash-Shuqayri's removal from his PLO post in December 1967. NCNA on 23 July last year announced the arrival in Peking of the "new representative of the PLO organization in China and the head of the PLO mission in Peking," and has reported his presence recently at several functions.

In his banquet speech Li makes the customary PRC assaults against "U.S. imperialist tactics" in the Middle East, charging that recently President Nixon "kept clamoring that the United States would continue to occupy the Middle East, continue to arm Israel, and continue to commit aggression against the Arab countries in the 1970's." Li gives the Palestinians the usual advice to persevere in armed struggle and pledges the Chinese people will remain "the most reliable friends of the Palestinian people and the people of all Arab countries."

NCNA reports on the 22d that Li and Arafat held talks in a "sincere and friendly atmosphere," and on the 23d reports the delegation's visit to a PLA unit and other activities. At the same time, Peking steps up its publicity for the fedayeen struggle with NCNA reports of recent guerrilla attacks, interviews with Palestinian fighters, and recollections of past operations. A PEOPLE'S DAILY commentary on the 20th assailed a new U.S.-Israeli "criminal scheme" to resettle the Gaza population on the West Bank and denounced "the 'fair and balanced' position of the Nixon Administration" in supplying Israel with aircraft and weapons and "instigating the Israeli aggressors" to "wanton bombing and frequent military provocations."

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WEST GERMANY

GDR PRESSES FOR FRG RECOGNITION AS KEY ISSUE AT ERFURT SUMMIT

Uncompromising East German insistence upon West German recognition of the GDR and establishment of diplomatic relations "under international law" pervades all GDR statements at the historic 19 March Erfurt summit meeting and followup comment. GDR Premier Stoph offered few innovations to FRG Chancellor Brandt in his lengthy, polemical opening statement, or in followup interviews and his report to the GDR People's Chamber on 21 March. GDR leader statements following the one-day meeting evaluate it as "useful" and "positive" from the GDR standpoint, but express disappointment over Brandt's "evasive" answers and his insistence on discussing "side issues" rather than the "basic issue," recognition of the GDR. Soviet reportage and comment relies heavily upon GDR media and news to similar lines in evaluating the summit's results. GDR, Soviet, and East European media all stress and deplore the anticipated negative reaction by "revanchist" elements in the FRG, particularly CDU-CSU Bundestag leader Barzel's statements.

STOPH OPENING STATEMENT Stoph's opening statement at Erfurt draws heavily on the most recent GDR draft treaty for establishing GDR-FRG relations, submitted by Ulbricht in December 1969, citing all its main points except that concerning recognition of West Berlin as an "independent political entity," and introducing for the first time as a formal negotiating point a GDR claim for "reparations" from West Germany and "settlement of all FRG debts to the GDR."* Stoph suggests in his statement that more than 100 billion marks were "lifted" from GDR citizens by "economic warfare," but no specific sum is demanded in this seventh and last point concluding his opening statement.

* The GDR claim that West Germany must compensate it for postwar reparations and economic losses resulting from defections before the Berlin Wall was erected in August 1961 has been stated before by Ulbricht himself, but is not known to have been formalized as a draft treaty negotiating point heretofore. Ulbricht warned in a 13 August 1966 speech on the fifth anniversary of the wall that "some day our bill will be presented" to West Germany for "economic cold warfare" losses, which he then estimated as at least 30 billion marks.

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The other six "fundamental questions" Stoph cites are essentially paraphrases of the December 1969 draft GDR treaty, in some cases embellished with polemical demands which appear manifestly designed to insure outright rejection by Brandt and provide evidence of his "evasiveness." For example, the point on normalization of relations is braced with a demand for "abandonment of the FRG Government's claim to sole representation in any form"; the point on mutual noninterference in foreign relations of the other state is linked with a demand for "final and unequivocal renunciation of the Hallstein doctrine." Stoph makes an ambiguous, implied threat in discussing the Hallstein doctrine earlier in his statement and after demanding it be "abandoned definitely and completely." He warns: "Please note that the GDR and its allies will not leave unanswered attempts by the FRG Government to obstruct the GDR in developing its international relations and to continue to exert pressure on third states."

Stoph flatly rejects Brandt's proposal for "special intra-German relations" as a ruse "to maintain the old presumptions to sole representation," and he calls this concept "entirely unacceptable for us and no subject for negotiations." Subsequent Stoph and Ulbricht statements stress this point, as does a NEUES DEUTSCHLAND commentary on the 25th summarized by ADN. The paper argues that Bonn's insistence on "special relations" would deny the GDR recognition under international law and thereby open the door for absorbing the GDR into the FRG by "use of force against the GDR below the threshold of military aggression" and by weakening it economically and in its foreign relations.

Despite the pervasive polemical tone of his statement, Stoph anticipates Brandt's proposal for a subsequent meeting, concluding that because of the "importance and complicated nature" of the problems, "further discussions" by the heads of government will be necessary, and that he is prepared to meet Brandt "in an FRG locality near the border." Current GDR comment emphasizes that Brandt must find "clear, constructive answers" to the GDR's questions in the eight weeks before the second summit on 21 May at Kassel, West Germany. As the 24 March NEUES DEUTSCHLAND argues, "Brandt did not answer one basic question in Erfurt: namely, what kind of long-term objective the FRG pursues toward the GDR."

**ULBRICHT COMMENT
ON ERFURT TALKS**

Ulbricht himself provides the most authoritative GDR comment following the Erfurt meeting, calling the talks "useful" and beneficial in "safeguarding peace" in a Suhl rally speech broadcast on the 20th by East Berlin radio. Ulbricht calls Brandt's attitude "disappointing" because he was unready to discuss "equal relations based on international law" and failed to present an "independent stand" but "drew back" to the three-power treaties and agreements. Ulbricht concludes that "despite all

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difficulties I am optimistic" and "convinced" that Brandt and his government "will ultimately realize that the fourth or fifth step can never be taken before the first one," a reference to Brandt's proposals for agreements on less contentious points before dealing with difficult questions such as establishing relations.

Evidence that the GDR leadership remains highly skeptical that any real change in FRG policy toward the GDR has occurred since Brandt's SPD-FDP coalition government took office is provided both in Ulbricht's speech and Premier Stoph's 21 March report to the People's Chamber. Ulbricht interjects repeated references to "revanchist poison mixers" and "reactionary forces" still active in the FRG. Stoph notes that some SPD leaders have "openly and unequivocally expressed their agreement with the fundamental aims of the CDU-CSU," thereby confirming that "they are simply hopefully seeking tactical variants and methods," through Brandt's "revival" policy, "to achieve old aims."

GDR MEDIA ON ERFURT The Erfurt meeting "completely dominated" the GDR's Berlin press on 20 March, ADN reports, with numerous headlines stressing the "GDR initiative" and its "clear aims" toward "peace and security." ADN indicates that Stoph's Erfurt statement was carried textually by all East Berlin papers, while only NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carried the text of Brandt's, the rest carrying "extracts covering an entire page." (Hamburg's West German DPA points out that the Erfurt newspapers published Brandt's statement in a "diffused" version, omitting references to "human alleviations" and ignoring completely the welcoming demonstrations for Brandt.)

Only one East German official acknowledgment of the pro-Brandt demonstrations in Erfurt has been monitored, an East Berlin Deutschlandsender report on the 19th that accused "some" West German journalists of seeking "to instigate spectators to demonstrations of sympathy for a policy which has long proven abortive." It notes that those "who sought provocations" later heard hours-long demonstrations supporting Stoph and the GDR leadership by "the people of Erfurt." GDR Foreign Minister Winzer tries to capitalize on Brandt's trip to Buchenwald during his Erfurt visit, claiming in a 22 March radio discussion program that Chancellor Brandt while at Buchenwald "had to show his respect for the anthem of the socialist German state, in which the testament of the Buchenwald inmates has been fulfilled." Winzer calls this "an impressive and ineradicable act of recognition of the victory of socialism in the GDR," arguing that at Erfurt the FRG Government "was compelled to negotiate for the first time" with the socialist GDR "as an equal partner."

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SOVIET MEDIA TREATMENT Moscow radio and press media give extensive coverage to the Erfurt meeting, much of it attributed directly to East German sources and consisting of reportage of Stoph's statements, the People's Chamber session on Stoph's report, and Ulbricht's 20 March speech at Suhl. Soviet correspondents and commentators uniformly describe the Erfurt meeting in terms such as were used by Mikhaylov in PRAVDA on the 22d, who called it "an indisputable success of all the forces interested in easing tension in Europe." TRUD reviewer Stolnovskiy on the 24th calls Erfurt "a significant event" with "clearly a certain shift forward, although it is still early to say that 'the ice has broken'" in GDR-FRG relations because the FRG "has not yet shown readiness" for a real policy change. Soviet media and commentators stress, in concord with GDR media, that FRG recognition of the GDR and establishment of normal relations "based on international law" remain the key issues. Moscow domestic radio correspondent Mnatsakanov observes on the 20th that the Erfurt summit "has once more convincingly shown that the FRG Government must more decisively reject the burden of the past if it sincerely wishes to start a new chapter in its relations with the GDR and other socialist states."

A negative appraisal of Brandt's Ostpolitik is offered by TASS Bonn correspondent Borisov on the 20th in reporting Brandt's Bundestag report on Erfurt. Borisov concludes from Brandt's remarks that the FRG Government "is still not manifesting readiness to make a real turn toward realism in its relations with the GDR. They prove that official Bonn continues to reject recognition of the GDR under international law." Commentator Zakharov takes a similar skeptical line for German listeners in a broadcast on the 24th, declaring that "whatever the color of the political figures" in the Bonn leadership, "their behavior is determined by one and the same idea," the "aggressive ideas" reflected in the West German anthem concerning unified Germany in its old revanchist sense. Moscow media stress that the Erfurt meeting aroused a "new rage of nationalism and revanchism" among FRG revanchists and rightwing CDU-CSU elements, commentator Zholkver on the 23d comparing CDU-CSU leader Barzel's 20 March Bundestag speech with the writings of "neo-Nazi" NDP leader von Thadden.

WEST GERMAN TALKS WITH MOSCOW, BUDAPEST ACKNOWLEDGED

GROMYKO-BAHR DISCUSSIONS Soviet media have become only slightly more forthcoming about the high-level Moscow talks with West Germany, in sharp contrast with the extensive publicity given to the Erfurt summit. Moscow noted in a domestic service report on the 22d that Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and FRG State Secretary Bahr completed an "exchange of views" on 21 March, but so far it has

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failed to confirm West German DPA reports that agreement was reached on establishing consulates-general in Hamburg and Leningrad. The Gromyko-Bahr meeting announcement was broadcast in several foreign and domestic beams, but so far has not been heard in German-language services. The announcement points out that Gromyko and Bahr "exchanged views in Moscow on problems connected with the intention of the parties to reach an agreement on the renunciation of the use of force between the FRG and the USSR." Moscow also specifies that the Gromyko-Bahr talks extended from 10 January to 18 February and from 3 to 21 March. (Previously, in the only other Moscow announcement on these talks, on 10 February, Soviet media had revealed only that "matters of interest" to both states were discussed.)

The implication that the USSR made no concessions in the initial phase is evident in the Moscow announcement, which points out that the delegations will now report the results of the exchanges so the governments can decide "how the discussion of the above problems should be continued" in the interest of achieving a relaxation of tension "on the basis of the status quo in Europe," a Soviet euphemism for West German recognition of the results of World War II and the altered German boundaries.

A relatively rare East German appraisal of the Moscow Gromyko-Bahr talks, in a Mueller commentary over the East Berlin Deutschlandsender on the 23d, asserts reassuringly that Soviet and GDR views on talks with the FRG are the same. Noting that Moscow "has correctly kept to the mutual bargain" in keeping the contents of the Moscow talks confidential, Mueller deduces from the cited reference to "the status quo" that preservation of this status is the basis for detente and "the general aim" of the Soviet side. He interprets this to mean that talks on renunciation of force "can be meaningful and successful only if they fit smoothly into the efforts to achieve European security." Mueller affirms that the GDR party and state leadership "share" the Soviet view stressing that recognition of existing frontiers in Europe and establishment of equal relations between the GDR and the FRG are essential for detente, and that "only such an official rejection of revanchist programs opens the road to direct negotiations on the renunciation of force." He concludes that "only if one is prepared to deal with all European problems as a whole" can the FRG make real progress in its negotiations.

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FRG-HUNGARIAN TRADE ACCORD A West German-Hungarian agreement to expand and liberalize trade relations, and to make the next trade agreement a long-term five-year pact, is reported in positive terms by Budapest media on 21 March, at the conclusion of a Bonn visit by Hungarian Foreign Trade Minister Biro. Biro is quoted by MTI as saying that the West Germans had also agreed to "contacts of cooperation" in a "much wider sense" than trade, to support Hungary's admission to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and to begin preparatory talks on a long-term trade agreement on 6 April. Biro also is quoted as remarking that FRG Foreign Minister Scheel had agreed FRG-Hungarian contacts also could be extended to "political and cultural fields." (The Hamburg radio on 23 March reports that Scheel had actually told Biro that the FRG was "ready to open diplomatic relations with Budapest," and that Biro "stressed his interest in improving relations.")

A MAGYAR HIRLAP report on the 19th quotes FRG Minister of Economic Affairs Schiller as saying he was "very optimistic" regarding prospects for development of economic relations, and "particularly pleased" at Biro's invitation for Schiller to visit Hungary, a visit which the Budapest radio reports on the 21st will "in all probability" be made this year. The same paper on the 18th noted the favorable reception by the West German press for this "first official visit" to the FRG by a member of the Hungarian Government, and that already economic relations were developing well "despite unsettled political relations."

USSR, GDR EXPECT FOUR-POWER TALKS ON "WEST BERLIN" ONLY

Brief reports by Soviet and East German media on the four-power agreement to start talks on Berlin on 26 March reveal a continuing effort to downgrade the importance of these talks, to impose a limitation on their scope in advance, and no change in the USSR and GDR viewpoints. TASS and the East German ADN carry identical reports on the 20th that the "ambassadors" of the United States, Britain, and France in West Germany have agreed with the USSR "ambassador" in the GDR to begin talks "on West Berlin." (The official announcement from U.S., British, and French sources, as reported by Hamburg's DPA on the 20th, declares that the "governments" of the four powers agreed to talks "on Berlin.")

There is little comment available dealing topically with the impending four-power talks, but reportage on the Erfurt summit meeting and its aftermath by GDR and Soviet media has included several restatements of stock definitions of "West Berlin" as "an independent political entity" and denials of any Western authority over East Berlin or Germany as a whole. GDR Premier Stoph made only one passing reference to Berlin in his Erfurt opening statement, reported by ADN on the 19th, which conspicuously failed to include West Berlin as one of the "fundamental questions" for negotiations. Stoph labeled as "untenable" the thesis "held in the Federal Republic" of "four-power responsibility for the

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GDR, and its capital Berlin as well." He added that the GDR's constitution and treaties confirm that the GDR "is not subject to either a four-power or to a three-power competence" and is "an independent and sovereign socialist state."

Stoph spelled out the GDR views on Berlin at length in his 21 March People's Chamber report on Erfurt, pointedly noting that Brandt had raised the "West Berlin problem several times" at Erfurt. Stoph declared that problems "affecting West Berlin are not a subject for discussion" between the GDR and FRG heads of government, reiterating that "West Berlin is not part of the Federal Republic and never will be part of it, that it is an independent political entity within, and on, the territory of the GDR." Stoph added that any past or present tension in West Berlin is "only a consequence of the misuse of the city by the governments of the Federal Republic against the GDR," and that he had urged Brandt henceforth "to refrain from all activities which are a burden to the situation in and around West Berlin." Stoph's People's Chamber speech, unlike his Erfurt statement, does refer to the "West Berlin" proposal in the GDR draft treaty.

Continuing East German acceptance of "four-power" authority over "West Berlin" alone was recently restated by Ulbricht in his 17 March interview with a French television agency, carried also by East German media, when he referred to West Berlin as "an occupation territory of the four powers."

Both East German and Soviet media continue to carry routine protests against FRG activities in West Berlin. On 13 March ADN reported an "emphatic protest" by the GDR Foreign Ministry against a "provocative statement" at an SPD regional congress there by FRG Minister Horst Ehmke concerning Brandt's "alleged right" to visit West Berlin. ADN routinely described West Berlin as "an independent political entity which is situated within the territory of the GDR and never was nor ever will be" part of the FRG. A TASS English report of this protest the same day said West Berlin is "situated amid and on GDR territory."

Moscow has not originated any current comment on Berlin, but a 1 February foreign-language commentary reaffirmed Soviet readiness to "exchange views" with the other three powers "on how to prevent complications over West Berlin, now and in the future."*

* For a discussion of recent Soviet and East German propaganda treatment of the January 1970 harassment of FRG traffic to Berlin, see the TRENDS of 28 January 1970, page 21, and of 11 February, pages 16 and 17.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

PRC WARNED AGAINST PRESSURING SOVIETS IN PEKING TALKS

Moscow follows up its 14 March TASS denial of Soviet military pressure on the Chinese with an authoritative 19 March PRAVDA article indicating growing impatience with the lack of progress in the Peking talks and preparing the record in anticipation of their possible collapse. Other Soviet press comment on China includes a 20 March KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA article on the plight of foreign journalists in Peking and a TASS article on the 21st discussing China's agricultural problems.

I. ALEKSANDROV
PRAVDA ARTICLE

The 19 March PRAVDA article signed by "I. Aleksandrov," the most comprehensive Soviet commentary on events in China since the opening of the Peking talks, provides the most authoritative expression to date of Soviet impatience over lack of progress in the talks. Renewing the complaint that the West is seeking to thwart normalization of Sino-Soviet relations and to undermine the talks, the article observes pointedly that the PRC's war preparations and anti-Soviet campaign were begun soon after the opening of the talks. This observation--notably more explicit in linking the talks to the Chinese war preparations than previous Soviet comment--is followed by a warning against the Chinese seeking to put pressure on the Soviets and a reminder that it is in the interest of both sides to achieve a border settlement. Moscow's evident desire to use the talks to patch up relations across a broader range of issues seems reflected in the article's reference to the connection between the border question and the general state of Sino-Soviet relations.

The Aleksandrov article echoes the 14 March TASS statement and the Tikhvinskiy article in PRAVDA on 15 February in denying that the Soviets are planning an attack on China. Like the Tikhvinskiy article, the present article reflects Moscow's concern over added leverage available to the United States as a result of Sino-Soviet tensions, and it cites the Warsaw talks in this connection. Where the TASS statement sought to offset any impression that the Soviets have been exerting pressure on the Chinese, the Aleksandrov article makes clear that the attention being given in Soviet media to the Chinese war preparations campaign has been designed to put the onus on Peking for creating an unfavorable climate for negotiations.

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The fact that the article is signed by I. Aleksandrov--an apparent pseudonym which has appeared only rarely in the Soviet press*--appears to indicate a serious sharpening of Soviet irritation over the seeming deadlock in the talks. PRAVDA articles with this signature have appeared in the past during critical periods in Soviet relations with the PRC and Czechoslovakia. An I. Aleksandrov article on 16 August 1967, during a period of severe tension in Sino-Soviet relations in which a Soviet ship had been detained in a Chinese port and the Soviet embassy in Peking had been attacked, provided a detailed assessment of events in China and their effects on relations with the Soviet Union, including the "war hysteria" then in progress in the PRC. During the summer of 1968 two PRAVDA articles signed by I. Aleksandrov on the Czechoslovak crisis coincided with an intensification of Soviet pressure on Czechoslovakia. The first article, on 11 July 1968, ominously recalled the 1956 Hungarian events in condemning a "counterrevolutionary" document published in Czechoslovakia; and the second article, dated 18 August 1968, indicated that the "foundations of the socialist system" in that country were being threatened by subversive forces.

Though the current article uses the characteristic Soviet propaganda ploy of depicting the Chinese as favoring a world war, it makes no effort to portray the PRC as a growing military threat with a nuclear missile potential, as was done in an article in the military paper RED STAR on 21 January. As for the Chinese "saber-rattling and threats directed against the Soviet Union," PRAVDA offers the assurance that attempts to address the Soviet Union in the language of arms will meet with "a firm rebuff." A similar assurance was contained in resolutions adopted in January and February by the Soviet trade union and youth organizations.

The overall impression from the Aleksandrov article is that Moscow is preparing its brief for the communist movement in case the talks break down or are downgraded. The article does not, however, seem to be building a rationale for more forceful moves against the Chinese on the grounds of a serious threat to Soviet security or to the cause of socialism.

* Judging by format and substance, articles signed by I. Aleksandrov are akin to Observer (Obozrevatel) articles in PRAVDA: not as authoritative as an editorial article (red aktsionnaya statya), but on a level above the usual signed commentaries. Observer articles characteristically deal with international issues in general--SALT, the Middle East conflict, etc.--whereas the I. Aleksandrov by-line has been used for articles dealing with problems within the communist movement.

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BROADCASTS TO CHINA Moscow's broadcasts beamed to Chinese listeners carry extensive comment on the I. Aleksandrov article and on the 14 March TASS statement, while continuing to attack the Peking leaders on a variety of routine issues. Further assurance to the Chinese on the portent of the "Dvina" maneuvers, to which the 14 March TASS statement vaguely alluded, is conveyed in a 17 March Mandarin broadcast--in the program designed for the PLA--which notes "incidentally" that the "Dvina" maneuvers "absolutely did not take place on the Soviet-Chinese border, but on the furthest western frontier of our fatherland." Soviet concern over Western trade overtures to the PRC is reflected in a 16 March broadcast warning the Chinese that the West is promoting trade relations with China in an effort not only to impair Sino-Soviet relations but also to exert influence on the Peking leadership's policy by making China dependent upon Western industrial and technological products. A KOMMUNIST article on the new CCP constitution, first reviewed by TASS on 12 March, is summarized in Mandarin in a three-part series. These summaries of the KOMMUNIST article contain the only references in Mandarin broadcasts to "Maoism" and "Maoists." Commentaries originating in Moscow's Mandarin service continue to attack Mao only by indirection, an apparently calculated restraint that contrasts with the sharp attacks on Mao originating in the central media.

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PRC INTERNAL AFFAIRS

PARTY RECONSTRUCTION, SPRING PLANTING ARE MAJOR TOPICS

Peking and provincial radios continue to report activity in the field of party reconstruction, mostly at the commune and factory level. One additional province, Anhwei, has established a new party committee at the county level; Heilungkiang, Hunan, and Kansu had previously reported committees at this level.

The Urumchi radio has publicized new party branches in a commune and mill in Sinkiang. Peking has reported new party branches in Shansi, Hopeh, and Tientsin. Some form of party reconstruction has now been noted, either by Peking or the local radio, for every province and region in China except for the four Southwest areas--Kweichow, Szechwan, Tibet, and Yunnan--plus Inner Mongolia. (The Kweichow, Szechwan, and Inner Mongolia radios still broadcast no local news and simply relay Radio Peking.)

Stress on the need for subordination of the revolutionary committee to the party persists. A KWANGSI DAILY editorial has condemned those who allegedly argue, "It is sufficient to have the revolutionary committee by itself--why set up new party committees?" The editorial, broadcast by Nanning radio on 14 March, went on to note that the party stands above all organs of power, "including the army, the government, and the mass organizations." It reiterated the thesis promulgated by NCNA on 15 December--"The relationship between a party committee and a revolutionary committee is that between the leader and the led." But a lengthy speech on 19 March by Wuhan Military Region commissar Liu Feng sounded a somewhat discordant note as he recalled the glorious history of the revolutionary committees, operating under Mao and Lin, without making a single reference to the party's reconstruction.

As spring planting nears completion, considerable propaganda effort is devoted to economic indoctrination. Although rain and snow in February were welcomed in the aftermath of an extended period of drought over much of China, excessive precipitation has now caused new problems in Fukien at least. According to Foochow radio on 14 March, seedlings "in many parts of the province" have been destroyed by "continuous rainfall" and low temperatures. The effort to plant early and gain an extra harvest may have failed dismally here. The Hunan provincial radio provides a more optimistic report for its area: thanks to the "early hold" taken on planting, 6 million mou of crops were already growing as of 10 March.

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A number of provinces have noted more extensive use of the new seed strains this year, and perhaps this factor will compensate for losses caused by poor weather. The Kunming radio on 8 March attributed the doubling of grain production in its suburban areas last year entirely to the new seeds.

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USSR AND ROMANIA

MOSCOW CALLS FOR FIRM LINE AGAINST LEFT AND RIGHT REVISIONISTS

Soviet concern over Bucharest's neutralist and nationalist sentiments at a time of tense Sino-Soviet confrontation and when Moscow is under attack from European intellectuals is reflected in three commentaries by Boris Vladimirov broadcast to Romania by Radio Moscow from 20 to 22 March. While asserting that the "splittist activities" of the Chinese have had no substantial success--the adoption of "anti-Leninist attitudes" by the Albanian and New Zealand parties are dismissed as insignificant--Vladimirov, in a revealing remark in his 20 March commentary, notes that the Chinese "have caused certain prejudices to the world communist movement." "Under their influence," he adds, "there appeared within certain parties revisionist tendencies, as well as rightist and leftist opportunist misrepresentations of the theory and practice of Marxist-Leninism and nationalist-separatist attitudes." He stresses that such "tendencies are deeply hostile to the revolutionary essence of Marxist-Leninism and must be fought."

In an apparent attempt to drive home the point that Romania's neutralist stand on the Sino-Soviet dispute is not in its own best interests, Vladimirov underlines in his talk on the 23d that Maoist ideological contagion of communists as well as noncommunists is a danger to the European parties. "Leftist opportunists, hiding behind Maoist phraseology," he asserts, "drag the masses toward adventurist actions" and "anarchism," and drag the party onto "a sectarian path which paralyzes its ability to unite the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters." Maoist ideology, he adds, is also "the source supporting leftist opportunist tendencies even within some of the communist parties; and a lack of struggle against them can lead to elements of ideological indecision and to a spirit of disorganization within the communist movement."

As if to criticize those who are shirking their international communist duties in this regard, Vladimirov recalls that "the participants" in the Moscow conference "said" that they were firmly resolved to consistently defend Marxism-Leninism and to fight "revisionism, dogmatism, and leftist sectarian adventurism." Although Moscow succeeded in using the June 1969 conference as a forum to drum up anti-Chinese sentiments, Vladimirov obscures the fact that the PRC was not criticized in the main conference document. Moreover, he also ignores the fact that at the Moscow meeting Ceausescu reaffirmed Romania's neutralist posture on the China question by publicly objecting to attacks on other parties following assaults on the PRC by Brezhnev and other delegates.

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Another commentary broadcast on the 21st, entitled "How Modern Revisionism Works For Anticommunism," reflects apparent Soviet displeasure that the Romanians have not joined in Moscow's propaganda counteroffensive against European communist and noncommunist intellectuals. Soviet concern over this challenge has been manifested in a number of lengthy articles in recent issues of the CPSU theoretical Journal KOMMUNIST which attacked increasing "distortions" of Marxist-Leninism by European "revisionists." An article in KOMMUNIST signed to the press 22 January warned that such revisionist views of socialism could lead to "ideological disarmament of the socialist world" and concluded that "it would be politically shortsighted to underestimate this danger." Following the KOMMUNIST line, Vladimirov asserts that "revisionist-opportunist" representatives in "France, Italy, Austria, and other countries" are using the Lenin centenary to attack Lenin's thought. He is particularly critical of communist dissidents for alleging that since the Soviet Union is a nuclear superpower it no longer needs internationalist support. By this tactic, he adds, they are trying "to weaken, isolate, and separate the socialist countries." It was not by chance, he concludes, that the Moscow conference documents stressed that "the defense of socialism is an internationalist duty of communists."

ROMANIAN DISSENT
AT CONFERENCE

Bucharest, in addition to declining to take part in Soviet propaganda efforts to combat ideological attacks from European revisionists like French CP maverick Roger Garaudy and Austrian dissident Ernst Fischer, some of whose arguments are useful to the Romanians, has apparently been lobbying for its own flexible interpretation of Marxism-Leninism at a series of Soviet-sponsored theoretical conferences in preparation for the 22 April Lenin centennial. The Romanian party's theoretical organ LUPTA DE CLASA's February issue carried an article--based on a speech given by the Romanian representative to a 19-23 January theoretical meeting in Moscow--which argued for a flexible view of Marxist-Leninism and called for a more tolerant attitude toward differing views in the world movement. "No one," the article asserted, "can claim to have said the last word on one problem or another." The Soviets may perceive in such an approach a developing conspiracy among the Romanians, Yugoslavs, and other independent European communists to undercut Moscow's rigid ideological line at the forthcoming Lenin centenary celebrations in Moscow.

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CZECHOSLOVAKIA

DUBCEK DOWNGRADED TO SAME LIMBO PARTY STATUS AS NOVOTNY

A RUDE PRAVO announcement of the expulsion of nine leading liberals from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, reported by the Prague domestic service on 21 March, adds that "Alexander Dubcek's membership in the CPCZ has been suspended" pending "the conclusion of the party investigation." Dubcek's status is thus the same as that to which Antonin Novotny had been relegated by the May 1968 CPCZ plenum, which "suspended" the party membership of the former First Secretary and CSSR President pending "final clarification" of his "share in the responsibility for the political trials" of the 1950's. Novotny had thus been virtually stripped of all political status in the brief five-month period of January-May 1968, but was saved from final expulsion by the Soviet pressures which culminated in the August intervention.

Dubcek's downgrading has been more gradual--dropped as First Secretary in April 1969, as Presidium member in September, as Central Committee member in January 1970, and "suspended" from the party in March--but nothing appears to stand in the way of a final expulsion from the party of the present CSSR Ambassador to Turkey as a result of "the exchange of party cards" currently under way and/or a show trial.

The 21 March RUDE PRAVO editorial, written by the paper's chief editor, CPCZ Secretariat member Moc, also announces the "recommendation that party membership cards should not be issued to" Josef Smrkovsky, Josef Spacek, Zdenek Mlynar, Jiri Sekera, and Cestmir Cisar--all former CPCZ Presidium or Secretariat members--as well as four other less prominent liberals, and that "they should be expelled from the ranks" of the CPCZ. The latest expulsions had been preceded by ousters in recent months of three other top liberal leaders of 1968--former CPCZ Secretary Kriegel, former Deputy Premier Ota Sik, and, earlier this month, former Interior Minister Josef Pavel.

The RUDE PRAVO editorial complains about the obstacles encountered by the current purge, citing "institutions and functionaries" who eagerly point the finger at "those who should not belong to the party, as long as they are from somewhere else, but they do not allow their friendly or well-liked rightwingers to be touched." It foreshadows a more drastic turn for Dubcek and others in charging that "many of these exponents" of rightwing opportunism "have not been able to understand to this very day how much they damaged the party and caused a deep political crisis."

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Belgrade's TANYUG on the 21st pointedly contrasts the current "suspension" and vilification of Dubcek with the tributes paid to him by the April 1969 CPCZ plenum which had replaced him with Husak as First Secretary. TANYUG recalls that the plenum had termed him "an honest communist," praised his "human personality," and noted that he had "won notable merits and respect of the broad sections of the citizens of our country." It adds that "similar expressions of gratitude and tribute for his work have been made by members of the Presidium Husak and Svoboda."

The TANYUG comment cites remarks by CPCZ Presidium member and Secretary Vasil Bilak in an interview carried by Bratislava PRAVDA and RUDE PRAVO, also on the 21st, to the effect that the party's "one mistake in January 1968" was that "we placed a weak man at the head of the party and we allowed two-faced people [the stock conservative epithet for Smrkovsky] to get into the leadership." At the same time, in his interview, the archconservative Bilak also echoes Moscow propaganda's consistent disavowal of any intent to restore Novotny to power. As reported by CTK, Bilak says "there was nothing bad about January 1968. It was no 'coup' or 'work of the right,' but it created prerequisites for the solution of problems which could not be settled in the Novotny era." Moscow's PRAVDA on the 22d reports Bilak's interview, including his mention of the expulsions from the party and his attack on Dubcek, but Soviet media have not so far reported Dubcek's "suspension" from the CPCZ.

GROMYKO VISIT The latest party action against Dubcek and the other nine liberal leaders was announced by Prague on the same day that Foreign Minister Gromyko ended his six-day visit to the CSSR. During Gromyko's visit, a new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance treaty was initialed by the two countries' foreign ministers, prior to the final signing on Czechoslovakia's 25th liberation anniversary, scheduled for 9 May. The bilateral talks were reportedly held in an atmosphere of "mutual understanding and friendship" with "complete identity of views on all questions discussed." The new 20-year treaty, which replaces the one already renewed in 1963, had been first announced by Husak on his visit to Moscow in October, with the explanation that it would reflect "the new contemporary situation" between the two countries.

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"DVINA" MANEUVERS

RED STAR STRESSES SUCCESSES, "SHORTCOMINGS" OF EXERCISES

An editorial in RED STAR on 18 March praises the "Dvina" maneuvers in Belorussia, concluded three days earlier, for demonstrating "the readiness of the armed forces to defend the achievements of the Great October Socialist Revolution." Implicitly underscoring the exercises' broader import for the socialist community as well, the editorial winds up with a warning against encroachment by "any aggressor" against both the Soviet homeland "and the great achievements of socialism." The depth of Soviet military might is dramatized in the editorial's observations that "many troops were in action" in the exercises "but these were only a small number of the ones we have," and that if "any other" units had appeared instead of the ones that were used, their performance would have been "just as good." The presence of Brezhnev at the concluding functions of the maneuvers--still without indicating the substance of his speech--is cited in passing as "further evidence" of the CPSU's concern about "questions of military building."

The editorial declares at the same time that analysis of the maneuvers "and of everything positive and negative which occurred during them has not ended but only begun." It goes on to stress the need to "speak out loudly about weaknesses and shortcomings" and that this analysis will yield maximum advantage "only if it is carried out from a critical viewpoint." It further adds that "a wide field of activity is opening up . . . for mobilizing people to eliminate this or that shortcoming."

Where the running accounts of combat operations during the exercises had tended to emphasize tactical successes of the "Northern" troops over the "Southern," the RED STAR editorial appears to make a point of recognizing the performance of both sides: It says "both the 'Northerners' and the 'Southerners' strove to wage the battle resolutely and at a high tempo" and refers, among other things, to an engagement involving participation of "large tank masses under conditions of the use of nuclear weapons by both sides."

Whereas last week's TRENDS indicated unprecedented Soviet propaganda coverage of these maneuvers, a reexamination of the statistical data in September-October 1967 reveals that the Soviet radio devoted the same amount of broadcast time to the "Dnepr" exercises in the Ukraine as it did to the just-concluded "Dvina" maneuvers.

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